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Kentucky590 is applicable to instances of gender based
peremptory challenges. Neither the United States Supreme Court,
Second Circuit Court of Appeals, nor the New York Court of
591
Appeals have squarely decided the issue.

THIRD DEPARTMENT
592
Sisario v. Amsterdam Memorial Hospital

(decided March 22, 1990)

Plaintiff claimed that the New York Civil Practice Law and
Rules (CPLR) 3012-a, 5 93 "which requires a complaint in a
medical malpractice suit to be accompanied by a certificate of
merit ' 5 94 violated the equal protection clauses of the federal 595
and state constitutions 596 because it protects only a certain class
of health care providers from frivolous malpractice law suits and
excludes other health care providers, as well as other
professionals who are subject to frivolous malpractice claims. 597
Plaintiff also claimed that the statute violated the due process
clauses of the federal 598 and state constitutions 599 because it

denies access to the courts by requiring a certificate of merit
590. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
591. Two federal circuit courts were split over the applicability of Batson to
gender based peremptory challenges. CompareUnited States v. DeGross, 913
F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding Batson applicable to gender based
peremptory challenges) with United States v. Hamilton, 850 F.2d 1038 (4th
Cir. 1988) (holding Batson is not applicable to gender based peremptory
challenges), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1109 (1990).
592. 159 A.D.2d 843, 552 N.Y.S.2d 989 (3d Dep't), appeal dismissed, 76
N.Y.2d 844, 559 N.E.2d 1287, 560 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1990).
593. N.Y. Crv. PRAC. L. & R. 3012-a (McKinney 1991).
594. Sisario, 159 A.D.2d at 843, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 990.
595. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
596. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11.
597. Sisario, 159 A.D.2d at 843, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 990 ("[p]laintiff claims
that the statute is discriminatory because it affords protection only to certain
health care providers while others who are sued for malpractice, such as
attorneys or accountants, are denied similar protection (as are certain other
health care providers such as osteopaths and chiropractors)").
598. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
599. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
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before a plaintiff may file a malpractice case. The court held that
6 00
the statute was constitutional.
Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiffs malpractice claim because plaintiff failed to accompany his complaint with a certificate of merit which is required by CPLR 3012-a. The trial court
ordered plaintiff to file a certificate of merit within thirty days
and to pay each defendant two hundred and fifty dollars.
601
Although that decision was affirmed by this court on appeal,
the plaintiffs never filed a certificate of merit. The defendants
moved to dismiss, and upon rejecting the plaintiffs constitutional
claims, a dismissal was granted. This appeal was then sought by
plaintiff.
Using a rational basis standard, the court rejected the plaintiffs
equal protection and due process claims. The court found that
there was a rational basis for the statute, despite the fact that it
excluded malpractice claims against certain health care providers
and other professionals.
The court cited Montgomery v. Daniels60 2 to support its
statement that, "[w]hile a lack of a certificate of merit essentially
operates to deny a plaintiff access to the courts, such access regarding claims not involving rights subject to special constitu603
tional protection may be denied if there is a rational basis."
The Sisario court further stated that when applying a rational relation standard, the court may uphold a classification even though
the state may have chosen another way to achieve its legitimate
objective.
In Montgomery, the New York Court of Appeals rejected the
plaintiffs equal protection claims brought under the federal and
state constitutions. 6° 4 The court upheld the constitutionality of
the New York Insurance Law 605 despite the fact that it denied
600. Sisario, 159 A.D.2d at 844-45, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 991.
601. Sisario v. Amsterdam Memorial Hosp., 146 A.D.2d 837, 536
N.Y.S.2d 242 (3d Dep't 1989).
602. 38 N.Y.2d 41, 340 N.E.2d 444, 378 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1975).
603. Sisario, 159 A.D.2d at 844, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 990.
604. Montgomery, 38 N.Y.2d at 45-46, 340 N.E.2d at 446, 378 N.Y.S.2d
at 4.
605. N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 5101-108 (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1991).
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access to the court to certain classes of people. 60 6 In determining
that the rational relation standard was, in fact, the proper test to
apply, the court examined analyses previously made by the
60 7
United States Supreme Court:
[T]he Supreme Court has made it clear that access to the courts
in and of itself is not an independent constitutional right. The
right to access to the courts will be accorded special constitutional protection only where the right sought to be asserted
through such access is a right recognized in the constitutional
sense as carrying a preferred status and so entitled to special
protection and then only where there is no alternative forum in
which vindication of that constitutionally protected right may be
8
sought. 60
Further, the Montgomery court wrote:
By contrast the Supreme Court has held that access to the courts
for the resolution of other claims (involving rights not subject to
special constitutional protection) may be denied if there is a
rational basis therefor; no proof is required of any compelling
State interest or that the legislative choice of means of accom60 9
plishment was the least restrictive.
The Sisarlo court decided that since "those in plaintiffs position do not constitute a suspect class, nor do the requirements of
CPLR 3012-a interfere with the exercise of a fundamental
right," 6 10 plaintiffs claim would be analyzed under a rational relation standard. The court acknowledged that the statute was designed to alleviate some of the problems "faced by the health
care industry due to high medical malpractice insurance
premiums which discourage physicians and dentists from
practicing in New York."' 6 11 The requirement of a certificate of
606. Montgomery, 38 N.Y.2d at 61, 340 N.E.2d at 456, 378 N.Y.S.2d at
17-18.

607. See, e.g., Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973); United States v.
Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
608. Montgomery, 38 N.Y.2d at 60, 340 N.E.2d at 456, 378 N.Y.S.2d at
17.

609. Id.
610. Sisario, 159 A.D.2d at 843, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 990.

611. Id. at 844, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 990-91.
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merit is aimed at reducing the amount of frivolous medical
malpractice cases commenced in the state. The fact that the
legislature has chosen to move "one step at a time" 6 12 does not
mean that the statute is not rationally related to the legislature's
objective.

6 13

In addition, the court rejected plaintiffs due process claim that
access is being denied to the courts "because an attorney must
first find a physician who agrees that the case has merit" 6 14
before a plaintiff may bring a claim. The court stated that unless
there is a right that has been recognized as needing special
protection, the state may restrict access to the courts. 6 15 Here, no

fundamental right existed and the objective of the statute is
rationally related to the restrictions the statute imposes.
Therefore, the court held that there was no denial of substantive
16
due process. 6
In 1955, the United States Supreme Court established the "one
step at a time" equal protection doctrine articulated by the appellate division in Sisario.6 17 "The reform may take one step at a
time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems
most acute to the legislative mind." ' 618 In 1970, the Supreme
Court wrote that the equal protection clause of the Federal
Constitution does not require that a state try to remedy every aspect of a problem legislatively or not address the issue at all. 6 19
Federal courts have also decided that mediation resulting in restricted access to the courts does not necessarily infringe upon
612. Id. at 845, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 991.
613. Id.
614. Id.
615. Id. ("Under due process, for access to the courts to be recognized it
must be in conjunction with a right recognized as entitled to special protection.
Otherwise the State may condition access to the courts." This is because

"access to the courts in and of itself is not a right protected by the
constitution."); see Colton v. Riccobono, 67 N.Y.2d 571, 576, 496 N.E.2d
670, 673, 505 N.Y.S.2d 581, 584 (1986).
616. Sisario, 159 A.D.2d at 845, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 991.

617. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483, 489
(1955).
618. Id.
619. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1970).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol8/iss1/41

4

et al.: Equal Protection

1991]

EQUAL PROTECTION

339

procedural due process rights. In Woods v. Holy Cross
Hospital,620 the court used a rational relation standard to decide
that a Florida law requiring medical malpractice claimants to
"participate in a mediation process prior to bringing an action in
court" 62 1 does not unconstitutionally infringe upon due process
by restricting or denying access to the courts:
Access to the courts is not an independent right; it is accorded
special protection only when the right a claimant wishes to assert
through such access is given a preferred status and thus entitled
to special protection and if there is no alternative forum in which
that specially protected right may be enforced. 622
The court stated that if there is a rational basis for restricting
access to the courts, there is no constitutional violation. Also, in
Holman v. Hilton,62 3 a United States District Court wrote that
denial of access to the courts is only violative of due process
rights when that denial infringes upon a fundamental right. 624
Absent such infringement, a rational basis standard must
apply. 625 The court referred to Ortwein v. Schwab62 6 and United
States v. Kras,62 7 to stipport its proposition. These cases limited
62 8
the application of an earlier decision, Boddie v. Connecticut,
which held that "due process requires, at a minimum, that absent
a countervailing state interest of overriding significance, persons
forced to settle their claims of right and duty through the judicial
process must be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard."' 629
Boddie was thus restricted "to cases involving fundamental
constitutional rights over which state courts have exclusive control. "

630

620. 591 F.2d 1164 (5th Cir. 1979).
621. Id. at 1166.
622. Id. at 1173 n.16 (emphasis in originial).
623. 542 F. Supp. 913 (D.N.J. 1982), aff'd, 712 F.2d 854 (3d Cir. 1983).

624. Id. at 919.
625. Id. at 920.
626. 410 U.S. 656 (1973), reh'g denied, 411 U.S. 922 (1973).

627.
628.
629.
630.

409 U.S. 434 (1973).
401 U.S. 371 (1971).
Id. at 377.
Hilton, 542 F. Supp. at 920.
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Therefore, the Sisario court is consistent with current federal
standards on equal protection and due process analyses with
respect to the issues addressed in that case. The federal courts use
a "one step at a time approach" to legislative initiative intending
to remedy a social or economic problem. As articulated in
Sisario, equal protection will not be violated if every aspect of an
issue is not addressed by the legislature. Further, federal analysis
parallels the Sisario decision in that access to the courts for civil
proceedings is generally not an absolute right and may be
restricted, absent a violation of fundamental constitutional rights,
if there is a rational basis for doing so.
Arnold v. Constantine 631
(decided November 15, 1990)

Recent appointees to the aviation unit of the state police
contended that the police superintendent's failure to compensate
them at the same pay rate as other pilots in the aviation unit
violated their equal protection rights under the federal 632 and
state6 33 constitutions. The court held that there was no equal
protection violation under either the federal or state
constitutions. 634
In 1985, respondent, police superintendent decided to expand
the types of duties to be performed by the aviation unit and increased the unit number of operational hours. Additionally, respondent re-classified new applicants for the aviation unit as
troopers instead of the higher ranked position of technical
sergeant. 6 35 In 1986, four new appointees, petitioners herein,
were assigned to the aviation unit as troopers. Upon respondent's
failure to promote petitioners to technical sergeants, petitioners
brought an article 78 proceeding challenging this failure to com636
pensate them at a pay rate equal to the other pilots in the unit.
631. 164 A.D.2d 203, 563 N.Y.S.2d 259 (3d Dep't 1990).
632. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
633. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11.
634. Arnold, 164 A.D.2d at 206, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 261.
635. Id. at 204-05, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 260.
636. Id. at 205, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 261.
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